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OR STRICT DISCLOSURE RULES?
Lawrence Zelenak*
Response to: Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer
Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 689 (2009).
In Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement,
Alex Raskolnikov proposes replacing the current federal income tax
compliance regime—which he describes as a “one-size-fits-all” system—
with a two-track approach.1 When filing their annual returns, taxpayers
would be required to choose between a “compliance regime” (CR) and
a “deterrence regime” (DR). The two regimes would be designed so
that “gamers” 2 would choose the DR, while all other taxpayers3 would
choose the CR. The DR “will look very similar to the current [tax
compliance regime], except statutory fines . . . may be higher (perhaps
much higher) than they are today.” 4 The CR would feature much lower
penalties than the DR. It would also include a number of “separating
features” that would be acceptable to non-gamers but not to gamers; the
separating features would drive gamers into the DR despite the DR’s
* Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 691 (2009).
2. Gamers are “rational actors whose marginal compliance decisions depend
primarily on the expected tax penalty calculus.” Id. at 692.
3. These are taxpayers who base their taxpaying decisions on any grounds other than
the expected tax penalty calculus —for example, on a sense of duty or reciprocity. Id. at
691–92.
4. Id. at 691. Raskolnikov explains that the logic of his targeting approach works as
long as penalty rates are higher in the DR than in the CR, regardless of the absolute
penalty levels in either regime. Id. at 714–15. In theory, then, his proposal could be
implemented by maintaining current (low) penalty rates in the DR and introducing new
(even lower) rates in the CR. In practical terms, however, the attraction of his proposal is
in the way it makes possible the imposition of higher-than-current penalty rates on gamers
in the DR, without the need to impose those same rates on non-gamers in the CR. This
ability to impose greatly increased penalty rates in the DR is a major theme of
Raskolnikov’s article. See, e.g., id. at 691, 741. In this Response, then, I assume that
Raskolnikov’s proposal would be implemented by maintaining current penalty rates in the
CR and introducing higher rates in the DR, rather than by maintaining current penalty
rates in the DR and introducing lower rates in the CR.
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much higher penalties.5 The two separating features of the CR that
Raskolnikov discusses in the greatest detail are mandatory binding
arbitration and the use of a strong pro-government presumption in the
resolution of arbitrated disputes.6 Both of these features would make it
much easier for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to win disputes in
the CR than in the DR. Non-gamers would not object to this, because
they do not take tax reporting positions that they expect the IRS to
contest. Gamers, by contrast, routinely take aggressive reporting
positions, and they would have to choose the DR to preserve their
chances of prevailing if the IRS detects and challenges their positions.
As Raskolnikov explains in detail, the observation that different
taxpayers have different attitudes toward their compliance obligations is
not original with him.7 What is original is his proposal to respond to
those differing attitudes by forcing taxpayers to reveal their compliance
types, and then subjecting taxpayers to different enforcement regimes
based on those revelations. Raskolnikov’s proposal is an important
addition to the scholarly literature on tax enforcement strategies. In my
view, however, the current federal income tax enforcement regime has
already slouched some considerable distance away from the one-size-fitsall model, in a manner not noted by Raskolnikov, by imposing stringent
disclosure requirements on the most important category of gamers—the
users of tax shelters. Part I of this Response describes the current tax
shelter enforcement regime. Part II compares Raskolnikov’s proposal
with the current regime, and suggests that there are grounds for
preferring the current regime to the proposal.
I. THE CURRENT TAX SHELTER ENFORCEMENT REGIME
Traditionally, a major attraction of tax shelters8 to gamers was the
opportunity to play the audit lottery. In many—probably most—
situations, gamer taxpayers using cost-benefit analysis would have
decided against involvement in tax shelters if they knew the shelters
would be detected and challenged by the IRS. Taking into account the
low probability of prevailing in court, the likely imposition of an
accuracy-related penalty,9 and the costs of litigation, the expected value
of the tax shelter commonly would have been negative. The calculus
changed dramatically, however, once the odds of escaping detection
(either by not being audited, or by the auditor missing the issue) were
factored in. The chances of escaping detection were high enough to
5. Id. at 718–22.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 694–701 (reviewing relevant literature).
8. The best non-technical definition of tax shelters comes from Michael J. Graetz:
"[D]eal[s] done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very
stupid." Lynnley Browning, How to Know When a Tax Deal Isn’t a Good Deal, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 2008, Wealth & Personal Finance (Special Section), at 6.
9. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2006) (imposing twenty percent penalty on substantial
understatement of income tax liability).
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induce gamers to participate in many tax shelters that they would have
avoided if detection had been certain, or nearly certain.
In the wake of recent statutory and regulatory developments,
however, taxpayers should assume that there is a near one hundred
percent chance that the IRS will detect their shelters. Treasury
regulations promulgated in 2003 require any taxpayer who has
participated in a “reportable transaction” to file a “reportable
transaction disclosure statement” with the IRS as a tax return
attachment.10 Reportable transactions are defined broadly enough to
include most tax shelters.11 Especially significant are the inclusions
within the reportable transactions definition of “listed transactions” 12
and “transactions of interest.” 13 In 2004, Congress enacted a series of
tax shelter compliance provisions on the foundation of the 2003
regulatory reform. If a taxpayer fails to comply with the regulatory
disclosure requirements, the Internal Revenue Code imposes substantial
penalties—for individual taxpayers, $10,000 for each failure (increased
to $100,000 per failure for listed transactions).14
If the taxpayer fails to disclose despite the threat of the
nondisclosure penalty, the IRS is still likely to receive notice of the
taxpayer’s shelter from the tax shelter promoter. Section 6111 requires
a “material advisor with respect to any reportable transaction” to
disclose the details of the transaction to the IRS,15 and section 6112
requires the advisor to maintain and make available to the IRS for
inspection a list of the taxpayers investing in the shelter.16 The Code
imposes substantial penalties on promoters who fail to comply with these
disclosure requirements.17
If either the taxpayer or the tax shelter promoter complies with the
disclosure requirements, the taxpayer will assume—probably
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a) (as amended in 2008).
11. Id. § 1.6011-4(b).
12. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(2). The regulation defines a listed transaction as “a transaction
that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and
identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed
transaction.” Id.
13. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(6). The regulation defines a transaction of interest as “a
transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions
that the IRS has identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a
transaction of interest.” Id.
14. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811, 118 Stat. 1418,
1575–77 (codified at I.R.C. § 6707A (2006)). For corporate taxpayers, the penalty is
$50,000 for each failure (increased to $200,000 per failure for listed transactions). Id.
15. I.R.C. § 6111 (2006).
16. Id. § 6112.
17. For failures to comply with the disclosure requirements of § 6111, the penalty is
$50,000 for each failure, or the greater of either $200,000 or fifty percent (seventy-five
percent in the case of an intentional failure) of the material advisor’s gross income from
activities related to the shelter in the case of a listed transaction. Id. § 6707. For failing to
make the list of taxpayer investors available to the IRS within twenty days of a request, the
penalty is $10,000 for each day beyond the twentieth. Id. § 6708.
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correctly—that the IRS will detect the shelter and challenge the claimed
tax benefits. With the audit lottery thus nearly eliminated as a factor in
the cost-benefit calculations, gamers should reject many shelters that
would have attracted them before the imposition of the disclosure
requirements.
Of course, the disclosure requirements solve the
government’s audit lottery problem only if taxpayers, their material
advisors, or both, comply with the requirements. The new disclosure
regime would fail if gamers and their advisors were to perform costbenefit analyses indicating that the optimal strategy is to ignore the
disclosure requirements and hope the IRS remains oblivious. Judging
from the comments of top-level Treasury and IRS officials, however, it
appears that strategic noncompliance has not been a major problem. In
2006, then-IRS Commissioner Mark Everson told a Senate panel, “No
longer are abusive tax shelters being marketed by top level accounting
firms.” 18 Similarly, late last year outgoing IRS Chief Counsel Donald
Korb remarked that “we —the IRS, Treasury, [the] Justice
[Department], the whole team—really turned the corner” on tax
shelters.19 Apparently the penalties for nondisclosure—which include,
in addition to the civil penalties described above, possible prosecution
under § 7203 for the misdemeanor offense of willfully failing to keep
required tax records or supply required tax information—have been
sufficient to dissuade gamers from continuing to play the tax shelter
audit lottery by intentionally failing to comply with the new disclosure
requirements.
II. IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
CURRENT TAX SHELTER DISCLOSURE REGIME AND THE RASKOLNIKOV
PROPOSAL
The tax shelter disclosure requirements described above can be
understood as a mechanism for separating gamers from non-gamers for
the purpose of applying different enforcement regimes—in particular,
different audit rates—to the two types of taxpayers. So understood, the
disclosure requirements are very much in the spirit of Raskolnikov’s
proposal. Nevertheless, the two approaches differ in several important
ways: (1) by attempting to identify only tax shelter investors rather than
all gamers, the disclosure regime covers a smaller portion of the gamer
population than would Raskolnikov’s DR; (2) the current disclosure

18. Deconstructing the Tax Code: Uncollected Taxes and Issues of Transparency:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Financial Management, Government Information,
and International Security of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 109th Cong. 54 (2006) (written testimony of Mark Everson, Comm’r of Internal
Revenue).
19. Jeremiah Coder, Korb Reflects on Long Tenure as Chief Counsel, 122 Tax Notes
20, 21 (2009); see also Browning, supra note 8, at 6 (“[T]he mass-marketed, abusive tax
shelters, with names like Cobra and Son of Boss, that were sold to thousands of affluent
investors from the mid-to-late 1990s to [the] early 2000[s] . . . are gone, having been
sniffed out by the I.R.S. . . . .”).
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regime relies on very high odds of detection combined with modest
understatement penalties, whereas Raskolnikov’s DR would rely on very
large understatement penalties combined with relatively low odds of
detection; and (3) the current disclosure regime has no effect on the
enforcement regime applicable to non-gamers, whereas Raskolnikov’s
proposal would radically change the rules applicable to non-gamers
under the CR. The three differences are described and evaluated below.
A. Tax Shelter Investors as Only a Subset of the Gamer Population
Raskolnikov includes within the gamer population not only tax
shelter investors, but also tax evaders who “underpay their taxes without
any justification at all,” 20 and non-shelter tax avoiders (including those
who “take aggressive reporting positions all by themselves,” 21 without
professional assistance). Raskolnikov’s hope is that his proposed DR will
attract not only tax shelter users, but also evaders and non-shelter
avoiders. By contrast, the current disclosure-based antishelter regime
applies only to tax shelter users. An advantage, then, of Raskolnikov’s
proposal over current law is its applicability to a larger percentage of the
total gamer population. It is debatable, however, whether this is a very
significant advantage. Raskolnikov himself suggests that the primary
targets of his proposed DR are those taxpayers “interested in using tax
shelters to game the system.” 22
It appears, moreover, that there is no real difference between the
DR and the current regime with respect to the treatment of evaders.
Raskolnikov concedes that evaders will generally opt for the CR rather
than the DR. In the CR they avoid exposure to the DR’s high penalty
rates, and they do not mind the pro-IRS tilt to dispute resolution in the
CR because they have no hope of prevailing on the merits under either
regime.23
Raskolnikov’s response to this problem—which he
acknowledges has “no perfect solutions” 24—is to identify various
situations in which it seems reasonable to force probable evaders into
the DR by denying them the CR option.25 His examples include
taxpayers who do not file returns, taxpayers who do not pay assessed tax
liabilities, “informal suppliers” in the cash economy, and taxpayers
previously found guilty of tax evasion in the CR.26
Something along these lines may indeed be the best that can be
done with this difficult problem, but forcing some taxpayers into the DR
is inconsistent with the choice-based rationale for Raskolnikov’s tworegime proposal. A major justification for the two-regime approach is
that the high DR penalties necessary to deter gamers are made politically
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Raskolnikov, supra note 1, at 717.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 748–50.
Id. at 749–50.
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acceptable by the fact that the DR penalties apply only to those taxpayers
who elect the DR. In Raskolnikov’s words, “Taxpayer choice, of course, is
at the center of the dual regime. And so it should be. It is clear that a
substantial increase in statutory fines is all but impossible if the fines are
applied across the board.” 27 Raskolnikov’s solution to the problem of
evaders, however, is to impose the DR and its high penalties on certain
categories of probable evaders. To the extent higher penalty rates on
certain types of taxpayers are politically and morally acceptable in the
absence of the taxpayer choice justification,28 higher penalties for these
disfavored types could be an add-on feature of the current regime (i.e., a
tax shelter disclosure regime combined with special high penalty rates
applicable to specified likely-evader categories) just as easily as they
could be an add-on feature of Raskolnikov’s ordinarily choice-based
system. In short, evaders are really outside both the current tax shelter
disclosure regime and Raskolnikov’s choice-based proposal, and so
provide no basis for preferring one regime to the other.
The case of non-shelter avoiders is different from that of outright
evaders. Many non-shelter avoiders would opt into the DR under
Rasknolnikov’s proposal, but they are unaffected by the current tax
shelter disclosure requirements. In this respect, Raskolnikov’s proposal
may be superior to the present regime. It is far from clear, however, that
this superiority is significant enough to justify preferring the proposal to
current law. As discussed below,29 the proposal requires drastic changes
in the compliance rules applicable to non-gamers, and does so primarily
for the purpose of facilitating the separation of gamers from nongamers—rather than because the CR is inherently more appropriate
than current law for non-gamers. If one is not convinced of the inherent
merits of applying the CR to non-gamers—for example, of denying nongamers access to the courts, and of arbitrating non-gamers’ disputes with
the IRS under a strong pro-government presumption—the need to
change the rules applicable to non-gamers in order to improve
compliance among non-shelter avoiders may be a significant
disadvantage of the proposal. In deciding whether that disadvantage is
outweighed by the desirable effects of the proposal on non-shelter
avoiders, it would be very helpful to have some sense of the magnitude of
the non-shelter avoider problem, in terms of both the number of
taxpayers of that type, and the dollars of tax avoided. However, the
magnitude of this problem is not made clear in Raskolnikov’s
discussion.30

27. Id. at 742.
28. For whatever it may be worth, my own sense is that it may be politically and
morally acceptable to force into the DR non-filers, non-payers, and previous evaders in the
CR, but neither politically nor morally acceptable to force informal suppliers into the DR
merely because tax evasion is widespread in the cash economy.
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. Raskolnikov, supra note 1, at 726 (describing non-shelter avoiders in qualitative
terms, but making no attempt at quantification).
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B. Deterrence by High Penalties Versus Deterrence by Near-Certainty of Detection
Under Raskolnikov’s proposal, the government would commit to
“not us[ing] the new information about taxpayers (their choice of
regime) to adjust its examination strategy.” 31 Thus, any difference
between audit rates in the DR and those in the CR would be attributable
to factors other than taxpayers’ regime choices. Tax shelter users in the
DR would face very high penalty rates, but would have a significant
chance of avoiding audit.32 Under current law, by contrast, tax shelter
users face a near certainty of detection (assuming the taxpayers comply
with the tax shelter disclosure requirements), but modest penalty rates.
Section 6662A imposes a penalty at the rate of twenty percent on
“reportable transaction understatements,” with the rate increased to
thirty percent in the case of an understatement with respect to a position
not disclosed on the taxpayer’s return.33 The usual twenty percent
penalty rate under section 6662A is identical to the twenty percent
penalty rate applicable with respect to non-tax shelter substantial
understatements under section 6662.34
Of course, any desired level of deterrence—that is, any expected
cost of tax avoidance—can be produced either by a combination of high
penalties and low odds of detection (as in Raskolnikov’s approach to tax
shelters), or by a combination of low penalties and high odds of
detection (as under the current tax shelter disclosure regime). Given
the deterrence equivalence of the two approaches, the choice between
them must be made on other grounds. There is a strong horizontal
equity argument in favor of the low-penalties-plus-nearly-certaindetection approach of current law. Suppose the appropriate level of
deterrence with respect to ten taxpayers, each of whom uses a tax shelter
in an attempt to avoid $100,000 of tax, can be produced by either (1)
subjecting each taxpayer to a one hundred percent chance of detection
and the imposition of a twenty percent penalty (resulting in a certain
tax-plus-penalty of $120,000 for each taxpayer), or (2) subjecting each
taxpayer to a ten percent chance of detection and a tax-plus-penalty of
$1,200,000 in the case of detection. Given the fact that all ten taxpayers
are identically situated (except with respect to their good or bad luck, in
the case of the second regime), the regime that treats all ten identically
is fairer than the regime which permits nine to avoid tax while imposing
31. Id. at 752.
32. Raskolnikov does not discuss what would happen to tax shelter disclosure rules
under his proposal, but the logic of his proposal suggests they would be repealed. If they
were not repealed, audit rates in the DR for tax shelter users —the most important
category of taxpayers in the DR— would be much higher than audit rates in the CR, and
Raskolnikov indicates he does not want that result. Id. at 752-53. The purpose of the high
penalties in the DR is to deter taxpayers despite a significant chance of avoiding detection;
the high penalties would not be needed if detection were nearly certain as a result of tax
shelter disclosure requirements.
33. I.R.C. § 6662A(a) (2006) (twenty percent penalty); id. § 6662A(c) (thirty percent
penalty).
34. See id. §§ 6662(a), 6662(b)(2).
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a whopping penalty on the unlucky tenth. This is a powerful reason for
preferring the tax shelter disclosure rules of current law to the proposed
DR.
C. Are the Features of the CR Attractive for Their Own Sake, or Only as
“Separating Features”?
In explaining the rationales for the various details of his proposal,
Raskolnikov distinguishes between details intended as “separating”
features and details intended as “targeting” features.35 Separating
features “create incentives that compel gamers to choose DR while
inducing non-gamers to opt for CR.” 36 Targeting features, by contrast,
“facilitate[] compliance by each group of taxpayers.” 37 Although some
aspects of the proposal might serve both separating and targeting goals,
Raskolnikov explains that the two aspects of the CR that he discusses in
the greatest detail—mandatory binding arbitration and a strong progovernment presumption—serve only the separating goal: “[They] do
not strengthen a sense of duty, trust in government, or feelings of
reciprocity. These features are unrelated to targeting.” 38
Mandatory binding arbitration and a strong pro-government
presumption would constitute drastic changes from the current
enforcement regime for those taxpayers—probably the substantial
majority of all individual taxpayers—who opt for the CR.39 Arbitration
and a pro-government presumption would be useful in driving gamers
away from the CR and into the DR, despite the much higher penalty
rates in the DR. It is not at all clear, however, that these key features of
the CR are desirable apart from their facilitation of the imposition of
higher penalties on gamers in the DR. Raskolnikov does not claim the
features are desirable for their own sake. In fact, he acknowledges that
both features are troubling when considered apart from their separating
virtues:
The pro-IRS presumption . . . will make it difficult for taxpayers
to challenge government’s interpretation of the law. [It] will
also limit taxpayers’ opportunities to test the line between
permissible and illegal positions. Binding arbitration will
undermine the development of precedent, inhibit public
articulation of values, and conceal overly aggressive
enforcement from public scrutiny and judicial review.40
35. Raskolnikov, supra note 1, at 739–40.
36. Id. at 739.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Raskolnikov does not predict what percentage of the taxpaying population would
choose the CR, but he does suggest—quite plausibly—that most taxpayers are nongamers. Id. at 701 (“In sum, gamers are a fairly narrow group. . . . Non-gamers, in
contrast, are a broad category . . . .”). If his suggestion is correct, and if the separating
features of his proposal are effective, then the substantial majority of individual taxpayers
will choose the CR.
40. Id. at 741.
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Having noted these drawbacks, Raskolnikov comments that the
existence of the DR as an alternative “will alleviate most of these
concerns.” 41
I am not convinced.
If individual taxpayers
overwhelmingly elect the CR—feeling almost compelled to do so out of
fear of the high penalties in the DR, and out of concern that it is not a
good idea to give the IRS the (mis)impression that one is a gamer—then
the existence of the DR does little to make the separating features of the
CR more acceptable.
It would be one thing to propose a greatly changed tax enforcement
regime for non-gamers on the grounds that the proposed regime would
be more appropriate than the current regime for non-gamers. It is a very
different thing to propose a greatly changed tax enforcement regime for
non-gamers in order to facilitate the imposition of a different regime on
gamers (primarily, to make feasible the imposition on gamers of
understatement penalties much higher than those of current law).
Putting aside separation issues, I am inclined to think that access to the
courts for non-gamers and a level playing field for non-gamers in
disputes with the IRS, are normatively superior to the contrary features
of the proposed CR. The case for the superiority of the current nongamer regime (again, setting aside separation issues) becomes even
stronger when one considers the disruption that the introduction of
Raskolnikov’s proposal would cause—both because any major change is
inherently disruptive and because the new system would require
taxpayers to make one more difficult decision each year.
All these undesirable effects of the proposal on non-gamers might
be worth tolerating if the proposal were the only way to achieve an
effective enforcement regime for gamers. As discussed above, however, a
strong case can be made that the current tax shelter disclosure rules are
a satisfactory response to the gamer enforcement problem.42 In deciding
whether the current tax shelter disclosure regime or Raskolnikov’s
proposal constitutes the better approach to the gamer problem, a major
point in the current regime’s favor is that it achieves heightened
deterrence for tax shelter gamers without the need for a radical revision
(in fact, without the need for any revision at all) of the enforcement
regime applicable to the non-gamer majority of the taxpaying
population.
But this should not be the end of the analysis. If Raskolnikov’s
separating features accomplished their separation goal, it would then be
possible to introduce targeting features into the CR that would not be
appropriate for a population that included a large number of gamers;
cooperative audits and cost reimbursements for prevailing taxpayers are
two possibilities considered by Raskolnikov.43 Although I am not yet
persuaded, it is conceivable that overall the CR—considering both the

41. Id.
42. See supra Part II.A.
43. Raskolnikov, supra note 1, at 734–37.
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separating features and the targeting features made possible by the
separating features—might be superior to the current system as an
enforcement regime for non-gamers.
CONCLUSION
By explaining the advantages of applying different enforcement
regimes to taxpayers with different motivations and by offering a detailed
description of how such regimes might be designed, Raskolnikov has
made an important contribution to the scholarly literature on tax
compliance and enforcement strategies. In addition to the attractions of
the specific proposal for a DR and a CR, Raskolnikov’s article is also
valuable for enabling the reader to understand the current system in a
new light—as already applying a special enforcement regime to the most
important category of gamers through its stringent tax shelter disclosure
requirements. Whether the current system’s way of dealing with gamers
is preferable to Raskolnikov’s proposal is a difficult question. All things
considered—including the effect of each approach on non-gamers—I
am inclined to think the current system is the better choice. But neither
Raskolnikov’s article nor this Response has attempted a comprehensive
evaluation of the relative merits of deterring gamers via Raskolnikov’s
DR, versus deterring gamers via stringent tax shelter disclosure
requirements. On that important question, much work remains to be
done.
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